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11 Introduction
There exists a large body of evidence documenting an unsatisfactory record of im-
plementation of IMF conditionality by borrowing countries (e.g., see Joyce, 2004). A
large proportion of IMF programmes is interrupted where such interruptions are not
an indicator of graduation from the Fund but rather one of future referrals (recidi-
vism).1 More speciﬁcally, the IMF has recently come under criticism for allowing some
countries to establish long-term relationships (or prolonged use), while, according to
its original mandate, the Fund could only guarantee temporary assistance.2
In general, a prolonged use of IMF resources could be justiﬁed by thinking of
economic adjustment as a multistage process that requires multiple IMF loans to be
completed. However, the empirical evidence does not support such optimistic view,
since the probability of “graduation” from the IMF by a borrowing country does not
appear to be positively related to the number of cumulated lending arrangements
(Easterly, 2005). On this respect, Conway (2000), analysing the transition from crisis
to non-crisis through participation in IMF programmes, ﬁnds that the greater the
time spent under IMF programmes over the preceding years, the lower the probabil-
ity of ending the crisis in any period, independently of other country-speciﬁce ﬀects.
Thus, prolonged use of IMF resources rather suggests a lack of eﬀectiveness of IMF
supported programmes (i.e., poor programmes implementation and/or ﬂaws in pro-
grammes design).
The possibility that some IMF speciﬁc interests may undermine the implemen-
tation of an IMF programme has recently been considered. Speciﬁcally, it has been
argued that if the objective of conditional lending is to induce borrowing countries to
c a r r yo u tr e f o r m s( w h i c ho t h e r w i s ew o u l dn o tb ei m p l e m e n t e d ) ,t h et h r e a to fe a r l y
interrupting ﬁnancial assistance in case of non-compliance should be credible.3 Nev-
ertheless, several obstacles to the punishment of non compliance have been identiﬁed:
political pressures (Barro and Lee, 2003), bureaucratic biases (Vaubel, 1986) and the
so called “defensive lending” practice (Ramcharan, 2003), according to which the
Fund would extend new loans to borrowers whose inability to service debt would
entail large ﬁnancial cost to the IMF.4
1According to Bird et al.(2004) and Joyce (2005), recidivist nations seem to be caught in a vicious
cycle: they start by entering Fund programmes out of necessity but then, presenting a poor record
of compliance, a large proportion of these programmes is cancelled. However, with no penalty for
past non-completion, such countries turn soon again to the Fund.
2A report published in 2002 by the IMF Independent Evaluation Oﬃce (IEO) deals speciﬁcally
w i t ht h ei s s u eo fp r o l o n g e du s ea n dp r o v i d e sad e ﬁnition of prolonged use based on the concept
of “time under arrangements”(i.e., a country is deﬁned as being a prolonged user if it has been
under an IMF arrangement for at least 7 years out of any 10). Under such deﬁnition, in 2001, the
arrangements with prolonged users represented about half of the total number of IMF programmes,
with a total exposure of about half of the total outstanding obligation to the IMF.
3We make the standard assumption that policy makers dislike the economic reforms imposed by
conditionality. Among others see Svensson (2000), Drazen (2002) and Joyce (2003).
4In the case of Sub-Saharan African countries, Birdsall et al. (2003) ﬁnd that donors, especially
bilaterals, made greater transfers to countries with high multilateral debt, despite their bad policies.
Marchesi and Missale (2004) ﬁnd that while in the case of low income (non-HIPC) countries both
multilateral new loans and grants decrease as multilateral debt increase, in the case of HIPC, such
“correction” does not take place.
2In this paper we propose a novel explanation of such lack of credibility of the IMF
threat. We argue that the repeated nature of the IMF involvement, together with
the fact that the Fund acts simultaneously as a lender and as a monitor of economic
reforms, can reduce its incentives to punish slippages in the implementation of agreed
policies. In a diﬀerent context, this argument has been ﬁrst applied by Boot and
Thakor (1993) to sustain the view that the lender of last resort should not also be
responsible for the surveillance of the banks.
We present a two-period model in which the adjustment process has a multistage
structure and the borrowing country needs to enter two consecutive IMF programmes
to complete it. In this framework the IMF is entrusted with two tasks. First, the Fund
has to monitor the country’s compliance with conditionality, where the IMF’s ability
as a monitor determines the probability with which departures from the required
set of economic reforms will be detected and possibly punished. Then, the Fund is
responsible for implementing a “social optimal lending rule” which consists in allowing
borrowing countries to enter new loan agreements only when the expected return from
their investments is positive.
The model is built on two crucial assumptions. Firstly, the Fund, as a monitor
of conditionality, is to some extent involved in the success of the adjustment pro-
grammes.5 More speciﬁcally, if the Fund is a good monitor, it is more likely that it
will discover policy slippages early enough to get the country back on track by threat-
ening the interruption of current and future disbursements. On the contrary, if it is a
bad monitor, with a high probability the level of reforms actually implemented at the
end of the programme will be that privately preferred by the country’s government.
Secondly, the outcome of the adjustment process can only be imperfectly evaluated
by the Fund’s stakeholders (or global taxpayers).
In this context we take a political economy approach by assuming that the IMF
is a self-interested agent aimed at protecting its own reputation as a monitor and we
focus on the consequences that such incentives do have on the lending rule adopted
by the Fund in equilibrium. We assume that global taxpayers are uncertain about
the ability of the IMF as a monitor. They never observe the actual level of the
implemented reforms but they do observe the country’s output (with one period lag
with respect to the Fund) and use this information to revise their beliefs about the
IMF quality as a monitor. This circumstance generates incentives for the Fund to
exploit its informative advantage to protect its reputation, by hiding its surveillance
failures. In turn, such incentives may distort its lending decisions towards greater
laxity (relative to social optimum) in punishing non-compliance with conditionality.
An immediate testable implication of the model is that the length of the rela-
tionship between the IMF and the borrower country may exacerbate the departure
from the socially optimal lending rule towards stronger laxity. In fact, when the Fund
decides to interrupt a ﬁnancial programme, after being involved with a country for
many years, this circumstance could strongly signal that the Fund has not been able
to monitor the implementation of reforms for a long time.
Therefore, we empirically test the hypothesis that the longer the relationship be-
5Its responsibility is actually ampliﬁed by the fact that the Fund also designs the adjustment
path (on this see Marchesi and Sabani, 2005).
3tween a country and the Fund, the more willing to lend the IMF would be. We
estimate a dynamic panel of 53 middle-income countries (listed in Table 1) over the
period 1982-2001, controlling for countries’ characteristics and their economic perfor-
mance and for strategic motivations (including the defensive lending hypothesis) in
Fund lending. We ﬁnd that a longer relationship, represented by the cumulated num-
ber of years spent by a country under a Fund programme, signiﬁcantly increases IMF
disbursements. The empirical evidence is thus consistent with the main prediction of
the theory.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is developed in Section 2, the
equilibrium level of reforms are discussed in Section 3, while Section 4 derives the
lending policy in a reputational equilibrium. Section 5 discusses some anedottical
evidence to provide verisimilitude to our modelling set up. Section 6 develops the
empirical framework and Section 7 presents the empirical results. Section 8 ﬁnally
contains some policy implications and concludes the paper.
2 The model
2.1 Overview
The model presented is a four stage game between three agents: the IMF, a borrowing
country’s government and global taxpayers. All agents are risk neutral and time
extends over two periods.
To capture the idea that economic adjustment is a multistage process, which
requires multiple investments to be completed, we assume that, at the beginning
of each period, the country’s government faces two “adjustment options”. The ﬁrst
option requires a ﬁxed investment I1, while the second requires a ﬁxed investment I2.
It is assumed that in both periods the country needs the IMF ﬁnancial assistance to
ﬁnance both investments. Financial assistance is provided through IMF programmes
whose duration is one period. Thus, the borrowing country’s government needs to
enter two consecutive programmes to exploit both adjustment options.
For simplicity, we suppose that the IMF requires a risk-free interest rate equal to
zero. Moreover, we assume that, at t=0, the country has already some investments in
place, which payoﬀ, at t=1, a random amount e y. e y has a distribution function F(.)
and a density function f(.) with support [0,y], where y is a positive ﬁnite real valued
scalar. The assets in place at t=0 expire at t=1 and so there is no payoﬀ from those
assets at t=2.
Figure 1 illustrates the time line. At t=0, the country’s government and the IMF
sign an agreement in which the Fund makes I1 available to the borrowing country
for the duration of the agreement. The government draws on these funds to ﬁnance
the ﬁrst adjustment option, whose expected output depends positively on the level
of economic reforms R1 actually implemented by the government in period 1, with
R1 ∈ [0,1]. The IMF subordinates the access to its funds to the implementation of a
level of economic reforms R∗ and it monitors the government’s compliance with the
suggested reforms. R∗ maximises the expected output from the investment,.and thus
it represents the social optimal level of economic reforms. However, since reforms
4eliminate economic and other distortions, they also reduce the level of political and
economic rents that can be extracted by the government for its private gain. For this
reason the government will always prefer a level of reforms R1 lower than R∗, unless
this choice will be opportunely sanctioned by the Fund.6 At t=0, the IMF quality as a
monitor is unknown to everybody but global taxpayers and the country’s government
have got a prior belief γ ∈ (0,1) that it is a good monitor and they will update their
beliefs by Bayes’ rule, as soon as they receive new information (at t=1/2, at t=1 and
at t=2)7.
At t=1/2 (interim period) the IMF observes the country’s reform eﬀort with some
noise.8 If the Fund is a good monitor, it will discover departures from the required
reform level R∗ with probability ρg. If it is a bad monitor, the probability will be ρb,
with ρg >ρ b. If the IMF discovers some departure from R∗, it can credibly threaten
the country to immediately interrupt access to current and future programmes.9 We
assume that the government will accept to live up with conditions and to ultimately
implement R∗ only if the Fund actually forces the country to switch to R∗.O nt h e
contrary, if the Fund does not detect such departures, the reform level achieved by
the government, at the end of the ﬁrst period, will be the one which the latter prefers.
Thus, the ability of the Fund as a monitor determines the probability with which R∗
is implemented in the ﬁrst period.
The ﬁrst programme ends at t=1, when the ﬁrst period output is realised and
ﬁrst period obligations are paid oﬀ. The country now needs a second loan to ﬁnance
the second adjustment option whose expected output depends both on the level of
reforms R1, implemented in the ﬁrst period, and on the economic reforms R2, to be
implemented in the second. The IMF now observes R1 and the country’s output with
no noise and, on the basis of such information, it decides whether or not to grant a
second loan.10 For simplicity, we exclude Fund monitoring in the last period, thus,
the level of reforms implemented during the second period will be the one privately
preferred by the government.
Global taxpayers are the least informed players. They can observe the country’s
output only with one period lag and they never observe the actual level of reforms.11
As a consequence, at t=1, they observe only the Fund decision to reﬁnance (or not)
the country and they accordingly update their beliefs. At t=2, if a second agreement
6More speciﬁcally, there exists a conﬂict of interest between the Fund and its borrowers due to
the inﬂuence of some private interests in the borrowing government’s policy choices. Therefore, with
no sanctions, the government will not meet the IMF prescriptions.
7The existence of some uncertainty over the IMF ability as a monitor can be justiﬁed, for example,
by the complexity of the monitoring activity (see Section 6 for a discussion on this point)..
8In our model, the interim period is meant to capture the traditional structure of the IMF
monitoring activity, which involves a periodical check of compliance with the performance criteria
and benchmarks of the arrangements.
9The credibility of such a threat is fundamental in our model. The Fund is invested in the success
of its own programmes only if it has some ability to “enforce” its conditions. In our model this ability
comes from its leverage as a creditor.
10The second period loan may also be seen as the second disbursal of a programme’s credit.
11The assumption that global taxpayers do not observe the actual reform level, even at the end
of the second period, is not crucial. In fact, relaxing such assumption does not qualitatively change
the main result. What is actually crucial is the fact that the IMF is able to observe the implemented
reforms one period in advance.
5has been signed, global taxpayers observe the ﬁrst period country’s output and they
accordingly update their beliefs. Otherwise, we assume that their information set at
t = 2i st h es a m ea si tw a sa tt = 1 .
If the Fund were a social surplus maximizer, at time t=1, it would implement
a socially optimal lending rule, according to which borrowing countries would be
allowed to enter a new agreement only when the social surplus from the new loan
is positive. However, since the IMF is also concerned about its own reputation as a
monitor, such reputational concern adversely aﬀects the eﬃciency of the lending rule
adopted in equilibrium. Speciﬁcally, since the reﬁnancing - not reﬁnancing decision
provides information not only on the behaviour of the borrowing government but also
on the IMF’s type as a monitor, the Fund might prefer not to interrupt ﬁnancial
assistance, even if the second period loan has a negative net present value.
L e tu sn o we x a m i n et h em o d e li ng r e a t e rd e t a i l s .
2.2 Adjustment options
The ﬁrst adjustment option yields a random payoﬀ e X1 at the end of the ﬁrst period.
e X1 m a yt a k et h ev a l u eo fX1 >I 1, with probability p1(R1) ∈ (0,1), and the value of
0 with the complementary probability.
Assumption 1. We assume p1(.) is a continuous twice diﬀerentiable concave func-
tion of R1. The function is strictly increasing within the range R1 ∈ [0,R ∗]12
By undertaking economic reforms up to the level R∗ the government increases
eﬃciency and thus it enhances the expected output from the investment. This means
that R∗, the level of reforms required by the IMF, is the social optimal level of
economic reforms.13 However, since reforms eliminate economic and other distortions,
they also reduce the level of political and economic rents that can be extracted by the
government for its private gain. Let C1(R1) be the cost in terms of rents reduction
associated to the economic reform level R1.W ea s s u m et h ef o l l o w i n g :
Assumption 2. C1(.) is a continuous twice diﬀerentiable increasing convex function
of the economic reform level, where C1(0) = 014
If the ﬁrst loan agreement is not interrupted, the country realises e y + e X1 at time
t=1. Whatever the realized payoﬀ at t=1 is, we assume that the country always
needs IMF ﬁnancial assistance to implement the second period adjustment option.
This means that y + X1 will be always smaller than I1 + I2.
12A degree of economic reforms exceeding R∗ has negative eﬀects. This could be explained by
referring to output losses due to social conﬂicts generated by reforms. For example, if the labour
force feels that an IMF adjustment program is imposing an unnecessary hardship, the government
may lack the political support to continue the adjustment program and eﬃciency may suﬀer. In
general it is realistic to consider the economic reform process as a sequential process in which time
is essential to allow the economy to adapt to the new environment.
13We are simply assuming that the IMF is instructed to enforce a choice of R = R∗which maximizes
the single-period social surplus from the adjustment options. Another possibility would be that the
IMF chooses R∗ to maximizes its objective function (1) but this would introduce another delegation
problem. In Marchesi and Sabani (2005) we consider the possibility that the suggested R∗does
not maximize the adjustment option expected output, which is equivalent to assume a ﬂaw in the
programme design.




∂R1 to avoid corner solutions in the maximisation problem.
6The second adjustment option has a random payoﬀ e X2 which takes the value of
X2 >I 1 + I2 with probability p2(R1,R 2) and the value of 0 with the complementary
probability.15
Assumption 3. If R1 6= R∗, p2(R1,R 2)=p1(R2); if R1 = R∗,p 2(R1,R 2)=
p1(R2)+α, where α is a positive ﬁnite real valued scalar such that p1(R∗)+α<1.
From assumptions 1 and 3 it follows that p2(R1,R 2) is strictly increasing within
the range R2 ∈ [0,R ∗]. Furthermore, we assume that the probability of success of the
second period adjustment option has a “jump” when the optimal level of reforms R∗
is implemented in the ﬁrst period. The rationale behind this hypothesis rests on the
fact that ﬁnancial assistance is more productive in a good policy environment.16 As
in period 1, the government’s private rents are a decreasing function of the second
period reform eﬀort. For simplicity we impose the following:
Assumption 4. C2(.)=C1(.)
2.3 The IMF objective function
We start by assuming that, at t=0, an agreement between the country and the Fund
has already been signed. Therefore, we do not model the IMF decision to enter into
the ﬁrst period agreement: in other words the Fund is called to “move” only at t=1/2
and at t=1. Let us examine the decision taken at t=1 and then proceed backwards.
At t=1, the IMF decides to approve a second agreement in order to maximize a
weighted sum of two arguments. The ﬁr s ta r g u m e n ti sa“ p r i v a t e ”g a i nd e r i v i n gf r o m
its reputation as a good monitor, while the second is the social surplus arising from
the second period investment. That is:
Max Z = λ1 {γ1 + δγ2} + λ2 {p2(R1,R 2)X2 − I2}, (1)
where λ1,δ,λ 2 are positive ﬁnite real valued scalars and γ1,γ2 are global taxpayers’
posterior beliefs about the IMF’s type at the end of the ﬁrst and of the second period,
respectively.17 Note that, if λ1 =0 , the IMF would be totally selﬂess, while if λ2 =0 ,
the IMF would be completely selﬁsh.
At t=1/2, if any departure from the required set of reforms is detected, the IMF
can deny access to current and future loans. Such a threat is credible if the Fund’s
expected payoﬀ from this choice is greater than the expected payoﬀ deriving from
maintaining the programme, despite the government’s refusal to implement R∗.18
15This parametric restriction guarantees that the borrowing country’s government always strictly
prefers to continue its relationship with the Fund at t=1.
16To take into account the impact of R1 on the second period expected output we chose this
speciﬁc functional form because of its analytical advantages. However, the qualitative results would
not change by assuming that, at the margin, the eﬀect on p2 of an increase in R1 is always positive
for each level of R1.
17We do not include an IMF budget constraint since the Fund might activate supplementary
borrowing arrangements (through GAB and NAB) if it believes that its resources might fall short
of members’ needs. It is plausible to think that the IMF ability to raise its budget depends on its
reputation, where reputation building is indeed an argument of the Fund’s objective function.
18At this stage, the IMF maximises λ1γ1/2 +λ2 {p1(R1)X1 − I1}+E(Z), where γ1/2 is the global
taxpayers’ posterior belief about the IMF type at t=1/2 and the expected value of Z is computed
on the basis of the equilibrium lending rule followed by the IMF at t=1.
7For the time being we assume that this threat is credible. We will clarify below under
which condition this is actually true in equilibrium.1928.
2.4 The government objective function
The government objective function consists in maximizing the expected value of its
proﬁts. Thus, at t=0, the government chooses R1 to maximize the expected return
from both investments, net of the private costs related to rents reduction. The choice
of R1 crucially depends on the conjectured IMF lending policy at t=1.
If the level of economic reforms R1 privately preferred by the government is smaller
than R∗, there is a positive probability that such policy slippage will be detected
by the Fund at t=1/2. Under this circumstance, we assume that the government,
facing the actual threat of losing IMF ﬁnancial assistance, and thus the possibility of
exploiting both adjustment opportunities, will choose to implement R∗.20 Speciﬁcally,
we are assuming that the government’s payoﬀ from implementing R∗ in the ﬁrst period
is greater than its reservation payoﬀ in case of no access to IMF loans. On the
contrary, if policy slippages remain undetected at t= 1/2, the government will manage
to implement the level of economic reforms privately preferred.21
Finally, in the second period, if ﬁnancial assistance has been continued, the gov-
ernment chooses R2 to maximize the second period expected proﬁts.
3 The equilibrium level of economic reforms
This section provides a description of the government’s equilibrium decisions in both
periods. We begin with the second period, taking R1 as given. Then, we analyse the
choice of R1, taking into account that the government is aware that its choice might
inﬂuence the Fund lending policy at t=1.
3.1 The equilibrium level of reforms in the second period
At t=1, if the IMF decides to enter into a second loan agreement with the country,
the government chooses the level of R2 by solving the following optimization problem:
Max
R2
l(R2)=p2(R1,R 2)(X2 − (I2 − e k)) − e k − C2(R2), (2)
19See footnote
20It may be very costly for a government to defect on the IMF, especially when oﬃcial or private
creditors around the world rely on the IMF “seal of approval” to sign their loan agreements. Obvi-
ously if the conditions to be implemented are particularly harsh, a country might still prefer to exit
from the IMF arrangement. However, for simplicity, we do not model here such possibility.
21What we have in mind is a situation in which the borrowing government tries to get advantage of
the diﬃculties in monitoring its compliance with conditions, by attempting to pass the ”test date”
t=1/2, with a level of reform lower than the one required. The robustmess of this hypothesis is
conﬁrmed by Goldsbrough et. al. (2002) who stress how IMF conditionality on structural policies
has often been exceedingly broad, without a clear order of priority among conditions. As a result,
compliance with a subset of these conditions did not ensure that the most critical problems were
being addressed, although it was often suﬃcient for continued access to Fund resources.
8where R1 is given and e k = e y + e X1 −I1 is the borrowing country’s own capital, which
can be negative.





= X2 + e k − I2. (3)
Recalling that, by assumption 3, the socially optimal choice for R2 is:
R
∗ = argmax p2(R1,R 2), (4)
we have the following:
Proposition 1 (i) b R2 <R ∗ unless
∂C2(R2)
∂R2 =0 .( i i )
∂ e R2(h k)
∂h k > 0
Proof. i) It is immediate from equation (3) (ii) It derives from equation (3) and the
implicit function theorem.
Proposition 1 implies that the lower the country’s own capital e k (i.e., the higher
the second period IMF loan), the lower the reform eﬀort chosen by the government in
the second period. This result is quite intuitive since, while the cost of implementing
reforms, in terms of rents reduction, is entirely borne by the government, the beneﬁt
(an increase in the probability of success of the adjustment option) is divided between
the government and the IMF. Therefore, the less the government borrows, the more
it obtains in case of success and the more it wants to reform.
We now examine the relationship between e k and the government’s expected proﬁts
in the second period. From equation (2) we obtain:
l(b R2(e k)) = p2(R1, b R2(e k))(X2 − (I2 − e k)) − e k − C2(b R2(e k)), (5)
which represents, for each value of e k,the maximum value of the government’s expected
proﬁts in the second period, conditional on being allowed to enter into a second
agreement with the IMF. We can prove the following:
Proposition 2 Conditional on being allowed to continue, the government is better
oﬀ with a lower capital, for each given choice of the ﬁrst period reform level.
Proof. Using the envelope theorem, it is easy to show that:
∂l(b R2(e k))
∂e k
= p2(R1, b R2(e k)) − I2 < 0.
Proposition 2 tells us that the government has no incentive, at t=0, to insure
itself against states of low capital at t=1 (conditional on being allowed to continue),
since its second period expected proﬁts increase as its own capital decreases (and
the IMF loan increases). This result obtains because of the hypothesis of limited
liability which implies that, in case of failure, the borrowing government will loose
9only its capital. In other words, since the loan is repaid only in case of success,
the share of the adjustment option NPV that the country can obtain is decreasing
in the level of its capital.22 In case of failure of the adjustment option the realized
output is zero Therefore, given the positive relationship between R1 and the expected
value of e k assessed at t=0 (namely
∂E0(h k|R1)
∂R1 > 0),23 the government’s incentives to
reform, in the ﬁr s tp e r i o d ,m i g h tp e r v e r s e l yb ea ﬀected by the perspective to enter
into a second IMF agreement. However, as we will see below, if the Fund adopts a
“tough” lending policy at t=1 (i.e., a lending policy which punishes bad performers)
t h eg o v e r n m e n tw i l lt r a d eo ﬀ the incentives to preserve its proﬁts in the second period
with the incentives to reform in the ﬁrst.
3.2 The equilibrium level of reforms in the ﬁrst period
In this section we want to derive the government’s privately optimal level of reforms in
the ﬁrst period. At t=0, the government chooses the level of reforms which maximises
the expected proﬁts from the adjustment option, taking into account the continuation
probability of the IMF loan. First of all we analyse the case in which the IMF never
stops lending at t=1, then we will analyse the case in which the IMF follows a socially
optimal lending rule. In the next section we will present the case in which the Fund
follows a reputational lending rule.
Let b R
j
1 represent the government’s privately optimal reforms in the ﬁrst period,
where j = L, SO, R indicates the lending policy followed by the Fund at t=1. L will
denote the choice of lending whatever the realised country’s output is, SO will denote
the choice of following a socially optimal lending rule and, ﬁnally, R will denote the
choice of a reputational lending rule.
3.2.1 The IMF never stops lending
Let us suppose that the Fund never stops lending and let L(R1) denote the govern-
ment’s expected proﬁts from obtaining the second loan. They are computed at t=0




p2(R1, b R2(e k
s))(X2 − (I2 − e k
s)) − e k





p2(R1, b R2(e k
f))(X2 − (I2 − e k
f)) − e k





p2(R1, b R2(e k
f))(X2 − (I2 − e k
f)) − C2(b R2(e k
f))f(y)dy, (6)
where e ks = X1+e y−I1 is the country’s own capital in case of success of the ﬁrst period
investment, while e kf = e y − I1 is the level of capital in case of failure. Moreover, yc
represents the minimum realization of e y such that e kf > 0,t h a ti syc = I1.
Let ρ = γρg +(1−γ)ρb be the prior belief-weighted probability that the IMF will
be able to enforce the choice of R∗ in the ﬁrst period. Deﬁning φ(R1)=p1(R1)(X1 −
22Introducing a ﬁxed cost of default would not change results.
23This is easy to verify by recalling that E0(e k | R1)=
R y
0 yf(y)dy + p1(R1)X1 − I1
10I1)−C1(R1), we can now write the country’s government problem, at t=0, as that of
choosing R1 to maximize the following:
X(R1)=( 1− ρ)(φ(R1)+L(R1)) + ρ(φ(R
∗)+L(R
∗)). (7)
The government’s privately optimal ﬁrst period reform levelb RL















where we assume b RL
1 <R ∗.24
3.2.2 The IMF follows the social optimal lending rule
Let’s start by deﬁning the socially optimal lending rule. Given R1 and the realisation
of the ﬁrst period output, for the IMF it will be socially optimal to continue lending
if:
p2((R1, b R2(e k))X2 ≥ I2. (9)
More speciﬁcally, the socially optimal lending rule would dictate to stop lending
whenever the government, in the second period, chooses a level of R2 such that the
a d j u s t m e n to p t i o nh a san e g a t i v eN P V .T h u s ,w eh a v et h ef o l l o w i n g :
Proposition 3 If R1 6= R∗ there exists a threshold level for e k such that if e k<k it
is socially optimal for the IMF to stop lending. If e k > k, it is socially optimal to
continue, where k is found solving p2(R1, b R2(k))X2 = I2.
Proof. The result follows immediately from Proposition by recalling that
∂ e R2(h k)
∂h k > 0.
Assumption 5. If R1 = R∗, for the IMF it is always socially optimal to continue
lending, that is:
p2((R1, b R2(e k))X2 =( p1(b R2(e k)) + α)X2 >I 2 ∀e k.
Assumption 5 implies that, if in the ﬁrst period the socially optimal level of reforms
is implemented, the net present value of the second period adjustment option will be
positive, independently of b R2. Thus, under a socially optimal lending rule, accom-
plishment of conditionality in the ﬁrst period is a suﬃcient condition for obtaining a
second loan at t=1.25
24We are excluding the possibility that the increase in the second period probability of success (α),
due to the choice of R∗, would be suﬃcient to induce the government to choose the social optimum
level of reforms in the ﬁrst period. However, the case in which the IMF and the recipient government
had the same objectives would not be very interesting per sé.
25Alternatively, even with R1 = R∗, it would be possible to assume that there exists a threshold
value of k such that, for smaller values of k, for the IMF it would never be socially optimal to keep
on lending. However, while complicating the analysis, this hypothesis would not change signiﬁcantly
our results.
11Suppose now that e ks > k, f o re a c hr e a l i s a t i o no fe y. On the contrary, when e k = e kf,
let z = k+I1 be the minimum realisation of e y which allows the government to obtain
the second loan in case of failure of the ﬁrst period investment. Conditional on the
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if z>y c.
Thus, the government problem, at t=0, now becomes that of choosing R1 to
maximize the following:




1 be the level of ﬁrst period reform which maximises (12), we now show
the following:
Proposition 4 If the IMF will interrupt the disbursements whenever e k<k the desire
to preserve second period proﬁts will induce the government to choose a higher reform
level in the ﬁrst period, that is b RSO
1 > b RL
1

























p2(R1, b R2(e k
f))(X2 − (I2 − e k
f)) − C2(b R2(e k
f))f(y)dy,
w h e r et h er i g h th a n ds i d ei ss u r e l yp o s i t i v e .F o rz>y c we ﬁnd an analogous result.
4 Lending policy in a reputational equilibrium
In this section we want to examine whether the socially optimal lending policy is sus-
tainable in equilibrium. We start by assuming that the market (both global taxpayers
and the country’s government) believe that the IMF will stop lending whenever e k<k
and we will show that this belief is unsustainable in equilibrium. The ﬁrst thing to
show is that it is always true that: γ1(NL) <γ 1(L), where NL stands for “Not
Lending” and L for “Lending”.
If global taxpayers observe L, this circumstance can be the consequence of two
events: either R1 = R∗, or R1 = b RSO
1 and e k>k. Applying Bayes’ rule we have:
γ1(L)=prob(g | L)=
γprob(L | g)
γprob(L | g)+( 1− γ)prob(L | b)
, (13)
where:
prob(L | g)=ρg +( 1− ρg)
Z X1+y−I1
k
h(e k | R1 = b R
SO
1 )de k, (14)
and:
prob(L | b)=ρb +( 1− ρb)
Z X1+y−I1
k
h(e k | R1 = b R
SO
1 )de k. (15)
Since (14) is greater than (15), it is easy to show that γ1(L) >γ .26 Alternatively, if
global taxpayers observe NL,this event signals that the joint event R1 <R ∗ and e k<k
has realised. The interruption of the lending programme provides global taxpayers
with the information that the IMF has not been able to detect policy slippages in the
interim period and ﬁnally “enforce” the optimal level of reforms. Since this is more
likely for a bad monitor than for a good monitor, applying Bayes’ rule, we have:
γ1(NL)=prob(g | NL)=
γprob(NL| g)






26h is the probability density function of the sum of the two stochastic variables e I1 and e y.
13by which it is easy to show that γ1(NL) <γ . Therefore, it follows that γ1(NL) <
γ<γ 1(L).
If the IMF was completely selﬁsh its objective function would be the ﬁrst argument
of (1). If the ﬁnancial assistance programme was stopped at the end of the ﬁrst period,
the IMF would end up with:
γ1(NL)+δγ1(NL),
since γ1 = γ2. While, if the IMF did not stop lending, it would obtain:
γ1(L)+δγ2(L,e k).
We now show the following:
Proposition 5 γ2(L,e k) >γ 1(NL) ∀e k
Proof. (i) If e k>k, global taxpayers, applying Bayes’ rule, would obtain:
γ2(L,e k)=prob(g | L, e k>k)=
γprob(L, e k>k | g)
γprob(L, e k>k | g)+( 1− γ)prob(L, e k>k | b)
,
where:
prob(L,e k>k | g)=ρgprob(e k>k | R1 = R




prob(L,e k>k | b)=ρbprob(e k>k | R1 = R





∂R1 > 0, we observe that
prob(L,e k>k | b)





by which it is easy to show the result.
(ii) If e k<k, given the conjectured equilibrium strategies, this event would be
consistent only with R1 = R∗. Then:
prob(L,e k<k | b)








and the result is easy to prove.
Therefore, it follows that, for each level of e k w h i c hi so b s e r v e db yg l o b a lt a x p a y e r s
at the end of the second period, it would never be rational for the “completely selﬁsh”
IMF to interrupt the programme. Thus, when the IMF is totally selﬁsh, the socially
optimal lending rule cannot be sustainable in equilibrium.27 Alternatively, when the
27When the IMF is completely selﬂess (i.e., it is just a social surplus maximizer) it will always
apply the socially optimal lending rule and so this will be the only possible equilibrium.
14IMF objective function is a mix of the two arguments (reputation and the NPV
of the second period adjustment option), the IMF will weight the reputation loss
deriving from the decision of stopping the programme against the welfare loss deriving
from the decision to ﬁnance an investment with a negative NPV. In this case, the
following Proposition describes the IMF optimal strategies, given the global taxpayers
equilibrium beliefs.
Proposition 6 The following strategies and beliefs constitute a Bayesian sub-game
perfect equilibrium.
IMF equilibrium strategies (reputational lending rule).
When R1 = R∗, the IMF will continue lending whatever the level of capital is.
When R1 6= R∗, the IMF will stop lending if e k ≤
← −
k,while it will continue lending if
e k >
− →




k,the IMF will continue lending with
probability θ(e k), where
∂θ(h k)





Global taxpayers equilibrium beliefs.
At t=1, if global taxpayers observe L, they would know that this can be due to
two events: either R1 = R∗ or, with probability θ(e k), R1 6= R∗ and e k>
← −
k,and they
would update their beliefs accordingly, using Bayes’ rule. Alternatively, if they observe
NL, they would know with certainty that R1 6= R∗ and they would update their beliefs
accordingly using Bayes’ rule.
At t=2, we should distinguish two events:
(i) L has been observed at t=1. If global taxpayers now observe e k ≤
← −
k they would
know with certainty that R1 = R∗ and they would update their beliefs accordingly,
using Bayes’ rule. If global taxpayers observe e k>
← −
k they would know that this can
be due to two events: either R1 = R∗ or, with probability θ(e k), R1 6= R∗ and e k>
← −
k,
and they would update their beliefs accordingly using Bayes’ rule.
(ii) NL has been observed at t=1. Since the information set remains the same
over the two periods: γ1 = γ2.
Proof. See the Appendix
Proposition 6 implies that in equilibrium the IMF will stop lending less often than
it would be recommended by a socially optimal lending rule. Figure 2 represents the
welfare loss and the private gain in reputation of the IMF as a function of the level
of capital e k. According to the value of e k, three relevant cases are represented.
If −I1 ≤ e k ≤
← −
k,since the welfare loss associated to the choice of lending is greater
than the private gain in reputation, the IMF will not have any incentive to deviate
from the equilibrium strategy “not lending” (NL). Alternatively, if
− →
k ≤ e k ≤ k,
the private gain in reputation associated to lending (L) is greater than the welfare
loss associated to the same strategy when R1 6= R∗, and so the Fund will lend with
probability one. Finally, if
← −
k ≤ e k ≤
− →
k,for the equilibrium strategies to be consistent
with the equilibrium beliefs, the probability of lending (θ(e k)) should be such that the
private gain in reputation from choosing L instead of NL is exactly oﬀset by the
welfare loss associated to the lending strategy when R1 6= R∗, namely the IMF should
be indiﬀerent between L and NL.
15Proposition 7 Given the IMF reputational lending rule, b RR
1 is the value of R1 which




Proof. Since in equilibrium the IMF will stop lending less often than it would be
recommended by a socially optimal lending rule, this result is proved by applying
Proposition 4
T h et h r e a to ff u t u r et e r m i n a t i o no fa nI M Fp r o g r a m m ei sm e a n tt ob et h em a i n
factor which may contrast the government’s adverse incentives towards reforming.
However, we have shown that if the IMF cares about its reputation as a good monitor,
the existence of uncertainty about its ability to enforce conditionality can distort its
lending policy towards a too lax behaviour. This in turn implies larger departures
from R∗, in the ﬁrst period, with respect to the level of reforms implemented under
the socially optimal lending rule. Moreover, the more lax the lending policy, the
higher the probability of ﬁnancing an adjustment option with a negative NPV in the
second period, since the level of second period reforms chosen by the government is
an increasing function of a country’s capital.28
5D i s c u s s i o n
The crucial idea of the paper rests on the fact that since the IMF is not only a lender
but also a monitor of the adjustment process followed by a borrowing country, it is,
at least to some extent, involved in the success of a conditional lending programme.
In other words, the failure of the adjustment programme could be attributed in part
to the lack of political will of the government and in part to the IMF inability to put
the country back on track by adequately sanctioning noncompliance. In a context of
asymmetric information, where the Fund has an informational advantage respect to
global taxpayers, coupled with the existence of incomplete information regarding the
IMF’s type, the Fund might have the incentive to use its informational advantage to
defend its reputation as a monitor.29
28Under the reputational lending rule, the condition that should be satisﬁed, for the threat of




1 )X1 − I1
o
+ E(Z(b RR
1 )) <λ 1
n
γ1/2 + γ1 + δγ2
o
.
The left hand side represents the Fund’s expected payoﬀ from not interrupting the ﬁrst agreement,
even if the government is not implementing R∗. While the right hand side represents the Fund’s
expected payoﬀ from breaking the contract. When the programme is continued, global taxpayers’
beliefs, at t=1/2, are equal to prior beliefs, since they do not receive new information at this stage.
On the contrary, when the agreement is interrupted, global taxpayers’ beliefs will be positively
revised at t=1/2 (i.e., γ1/2 =
γρg
γρg+(1−γ)ρb >γ ), since this event is more likely with a good monitor.
After t=1/2 global taxpayers’ beliefs will remain the same (γ1/2 = γ1 = γ2). Since the agreement is
never interrupted in equilibrium, these beliefs are out of equilibrium.
29Obviously a full evaluation of the eﬀectiveness of IMF programmes requires considering the
extent of compliace with conditions (which might depend on the quality of the IMF as a monitor)
but also a consideration of the appropriateness of the policy changes required by the Fund (IMF
quality as advisor). In the paper for simplicity we overlook the role of the IMF as an advisor
assuming that the required policy changes are always socially optimal.
16The robustness of such argument strongly depends on the existence of serious
diﬃculties in the IMF monitoring activity. The circumstance that Fund monitoring
may not be adequate is actually conﬁrmed by a report which was published in 2002
by the IMF Independent Evaluation Oﬃce (IEO). Such report basically identiﬁes a
number of reasons why Fund monitoring may be problematic.
The most relevant issues identiﬁed in the IEO report refer to the following aspects.
First of all, conditionality on structural policies has often been exceedingly broad,
without a clear order of priority among conditions with the result that the most
critical problems often remained unaddressed. Second, the Fund monitoring activity
can be complicated by ﬂaws in programme design (due for example to overoptimistic
predictions of real GDP growth and/or the rate of inﬂation) (Mussa and Savastano,
1999). Then, the report stresses that Fund oﬃcials often did not properly analyse
the key risks to a programme and especially did not specify the policy changes coping
with those risks (Goldsbrough et. al. 2002).
Finally, the report tackles the issue of political pressures. Speciﬁcally, political
considerations are found to have often inﬂuenced the decision to continue a pro-
gramme. Although it is not diﬃcult to understand that political considerations are
bound to inﬂuence the choices of an institution whose shareholders are governments,
too often have they been disguised as technical decisions, taken out of political con-
venience. The mixing up of technical evaluations and political considerations has
therefore contributed to weaken the IMF accountability and to increase the uncer-
tainty over its quality as a monitor. We believe that the cases of Argentina and Russia
provide some evidence on all these issues.
T h eI M Fh a sb e e nd e e p l yi n v o l v e dw i t hA r g e n t i n af o rm a n yy e a r sb e f o r et h e
emergence of the crisis in 2001. Throughout the 1990s, Argentina operated under
the close scrutiny of a Fund supported programme, thus the Argentina default in
December 2001 had heavy consequences for the Fund’s reputation. The explosive
growth of the Argentina foreign debt reﬂected the combination of low private saving
rates and substantial deﬁcits in the budgets of the central and provincial governments.
Despite Argentina’s failure to implement the required policy changes, especially the
changes in the level of provincial spending, the IMF continued to lend.
Thus, any failures of the Fund in the pre-crisis period were those of its relatively
low-intensity surveillance activities. On this respect, Feldstein (2002) observes that
the Fund encouraged Argentina to postpone dealing with its most critical problems,
not adequately punishing and warning it of the mistakes of its policies and Mussa
(2002) clearly reports that in view of the Fund deep and continuing involvement with
Argentina’s economic policies and the conﬁdence in those policies that the Fund so
often expressed, the Fund should be, at least partially, blamed for the mistakes made
by Argentina.
I nt h ec a s eo f R u s s i aw eﬁnd some further evidence of a too lax Fund lending
policy. On July 1998, the IMF decided to lend Russia $22.5 billion in the attempt to
avoid default (which eventually was not avoided). By that time, Russia had received,
since becoming a member of the IMF in 1992, four IMF loans and Stand-By Arrange-
ments totaling $18.83 billion. Each loan arrangements included as requirements that
the Russian government put in place policies directed to solve ﬁscal and budgetary
problems, in particular Russia’s government was required to get the oil companies to
17pay taxes. The failure of the government to meet such requirements did not prevent
the IMF from continuing to ﬁnance Russia, failing in this way to operate the due
diligence procedures.
There is no doubt that the laxity of the IMF lending policy was heavily moti-
vated by USA political pressures (see Stiglitz, 2002). However, the problem is that
the reﬁnancing decisions have often been supported by technical judgements.30 In
particular, political pressures have probably induced the IMF to systematically over-
estimate the growth rate of Russia’s GDP, each year since 1994, and underestimate
corrective inﬂation after liberalisation of prices in January 1992 (Nikolic, 2002). In
other words, there is evidence that Fund oﬃcials conducted an inadequate risk as-
sessment concerning their loan beneﬁciary and this circumstance made particularly
diﬃcult to understand in which measure the failure to reach some of the required
targets was due to ﬂaws in programme design or to policy slippages. This is, thus, an
example of how the mixing up of technical judgements and political considerations
contributes to increase the uncertainty over the IMF monitoring activity.
6 Empirical model
The main result of the theoretical model implies that the desire to avoid a loss of
reputation might lead the IMF to exhibit some laxity (relative to social optimum) in
interrupting ﬁnancial programmes. Moreover, the theoretical model suggests that the
longer the IMF has been involved with a country’s reforms, the more its reputation
as a good monitor could be damaged if it suddenly decides to stop lending (i.e., the
more “biting” its reputational concern would be).
More speciﬁcally, we argue that an early interruption of a Fund programme is
more likely to be decided at the very beginning of the relationship between the Fund
and a country, rather than after a few years. This circumstance is actually conﬁrmed
by the evidence presented by Mussa and Savastano (1999), who ﬁnd that the great-
est proportion of the cancelled programmes is found at the very beginning of the
relationship between the Fund and the country (speciﬁcally before the disbursement
of less than a quarter of the initially agreed support) and then it declines with the
disbursements.
Therefore, we empirically test the hypothesis that the longer this relationship, the
more willing to lend the IMF would be. We measure the length of such relationship
by building a variable where we progressively number the years spent consecutively
by a country under a Fund agreement. When the IMF programme spell is interrupted
such variable goes to zero and, as soon as a new programme begins (after an interval
of at least one year), we start counting again. We expect to ﬁnd a positive correlation
between the IMF disbursements and the number of years spent by a country under a
Fund programme.
The rationale behind this choice rests on the fact that each spell interruption can
be the result of two alternative events: either the graduation of the country from the
30In a press release, dated 20th July 1998, Stanley Fischer declared that the enhanced policy
package represented a strong and appropriate response to overcome Russian diﬃculties at that time.
A month later Russian government defaulted on its debt.
18IMF, or the IMF decision to interrupt its disbursements because the welfare losses are
higher than the losses in reputation. In both cases, when a new programme starts,
we argue that the IMF behaviour would not be aﬀected by the past since, in the
worst event, global taxpayers have already updated their beliefs. We believe that
an interruption of at least one year is suﬃcient to induce global taxpayers to revise
their prior beliefs about the IMF ability.31 In fact, according to Mussa and Savastano
(1999), in more than half of the episodes of early interruptions, subsequent arrange-
ments are approved up to one month following the cancellation of prior ones. Such
short interruptions indicate that, following deviations from performances clauses, the
borrowing country and the IMF were able to rapidly agree on a revised programme
and that the “new” agreement should actually be interpreted as a revision of the old
one. Thus, if a Fund programme begins after an interval of at least one year from a
previous cancellation, then it may deﬁnitely be considered as a “new” programme.
We will examine the behaviour of IMF disbursements for the period 1982-2001.
The reason we focus on this period is that the debt crisis of the early 1980s arguably
marked a shift in regime. Data on loans are from Global Development Finance (GDF)
and World Development Indicator statistics of the World Bank. We conﬁne our at-
tention to long-term loans, since the GDF database does not provide any information
on the type of creditor in the case of short-term loans. However, long-term loans are
fairly representative of the aggregate behaviour, since short-term loans have been a
small share of total loans for the period under investigation.
We estimate a dynamic panel of 53 middle-income countries for the period 1982
to 2001 including both country-speciﬁca n dt i m ee ﬀects.32 Data availability has also
limited the sample group to 53 middle-income countries. Among IMF programmes
we consider Stand-By Arrangements (SBA), Extended Fund Facility (EFF), Struc-
tural Adjustment Facilities (SAF) and Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facilities
(ESAF) (renamed Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) since 1999). How-
e v e r ,s i n c eo u rs a m p l ei sl i m i t e dt om i d d l e - i n c o m ee c o n o m i e s ,t h em o s tc o m m o np r o -
grammes are Stand-By Arrangements and Extended Fund Facility loans.
We have chosen a dynamic speciﬁcation (i.e., we include a lag of the dependent
variable among the regressors) to account for the short run dynamics of IMF dis-
bursements. The estimated equation for IMF disbursements is then the following:




i,t−1 + b4Zi,t−1 + b5Yi,t + b6Ci + b7Tt. (16)
Di,t denotes IMF disbursements (relative to GDP) to country i and D
j
i,t−1 denotes
lagged long-term disbursements (relative to GDP) to country i from creditor j (i.e.,
bilaterals, multilaterals, excluding the Fund, and private creditors, as distinguished
between commercial banks and private bondholders). B
j
i,t−1 denotes lagged stock of
long-term debt (relative to GDP) held by the diﬀerent j types of creditors.
31However, to check the robustness of our results, we have also tried to use a “looser” criterion,
according to which a new programme can be interpreted also as a new relationship only if it begins
after an interruption of at least two years. The coeﬃcient of such a variable is still positive and
signiﬁcant, even if its level of signiﬁcance is lower (at the 10% level).
32The World Bank divides economies among income groups according to their gross national
income (GNI) per capita. To be classiﬁed as middle income a country should have an annual GNI
per capita included in the range between $826 and $10,065.
19To control for countries characteristics, we include the set of variables Zi,t−1 as
explanatory variables while Yi,t represents the cumulative years spent by a country
under each Fund programme. The countries dummies Ci are used to control for
country speciﬁc characteristics and, ﬁnally, Tt is a set of time dummies which should
capture the contemporaneous correlations across countries.
Equation 16 can be interpreted as a reduced form derived from both the “demand”
for an IMF programme by a recipient country and the IMF “supply” (see Knight and
Santaella (1997).
The set of variables Zt−1 has been chosen among those suggested by the literature
on the determinants of IMF loans. Therefore, Zt−1 includes (previous year) economic
performance as measured with the per capita income, the rate of inﬂation, GDP
growth, the amount of international reserves (to imports), the current account balance
(to GDP), the domestic (ﬁxed) investments (to GDP), the growth of government
consumption (to GDP), total debt service (to exports). These variables should control
for the demand side of IMF loans.
Among the “supply side variables” we include population among the regressors,
as larger countries may be more important for the world economy and thus get more
easily support (under the so called “too big to fail” hypothesis). To examine the rela-
tion between IMF disbursements and a country’s degree of indebtedness, we consider
the debt owed to bilateral, multilateral and private creditors, and enter the four types
of debt separately. That is a high level of indebtedness could explain greater IMF
disbursements as they may be motivated by an IMF concern for ﬁnancial stability
and thus by its desire to prevent a default.
Moreover, we distinguished among creditors in order to ﬁnd out whether some
creditors were more ”active” than others in pressing the IMF to lend to countries
which are highly exposed to them or to their banks. As in Copelovitch (2004) and
Dreher (2004), IMF lending decisions are supposed to be responsive to the interests of
large industrial countries. We also expect that the countries dummies capture some
other strategic motivations for IMF loans, which have been examined in the literature,
as special interests or share of IMF quotas (e.g., Barro and Lee, 2003; Ivanova et al.,
2003). Ideally, we would also employ a country’s quota in the Fund, determining
its voting power. However, given that our analysis includes country dummies, and
quotas did not change over the period of study, we cannot use it.33
Very recently a so called ”defensive lending” hypothesis has also been investigated.
According to such hypothesis the IMF would repeatedly extend new loans to borrow-
ers with repayment diﬃculties to ensure that existing debt is serviced on schedule
(i.e., not to report an economic loss in its balance sheets). Thus, in order to control
for such motivation of the IMF lending behaviour we include among our regressors
the countries’ shares in the IMF loan portfolio. In case of defensive lending we then
would expect that the countries accounting for a larger share of the Fund portfolio
should obtain greater disbursements.
33The recent work in Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland (2006) suggests an additional proxy for US
and other major Fund members’ interests. They show that non-permanent members of the United
Nations Security Council are more likely to receive IMF programmes and fewer conditions under
these programmes. However, according to Sturm et al. (2005), such political factors seem more
closely related to the conclusion of an agreement with the IMF than to the disbursement of a loan.
20Finally, to control for policy reform eﬀort, we use the World Bank’s Country Policy
and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) index, which gives an explicit measure of the
quality of the policy and institutional environment in each country.34 Such index
is calculated annually by World Bank country specialists and it has 20 components
(each with a 5% weight in the overall rating) measuring macroeconomic, structural,
social and public sector institutions and policies on a scale of 1 to 6 (low through
high). The IMF should generally prefer lending to countries having a better policy
environment.
Tables 2 and 3 contain all the details on our variable deﬁnitions and sources.
6.1 The estimation method
We adopt a GLS ﬁxed eﬀect estimator in order to control for countries unobservables
and to correct for heteroskedasticity across countries. To account for the short run
dynamics of IMF loans we include a lag of the dependent variable among the regres-
sors. The dynamic speciﬁcation allows for a correct estimation of the eﬀect of high
levels of debt by controlling for the autocorrelation of the IMF disbursements. In-
deed, in the static speciﬁcation, a strong dependence of the IMF disbursements from
the IMF debt share might actually reﬂect the autocorrelation of the disbursements,
which are typically disbursed in a number of installments over time.
In a typical panel, which has vastly more individuals than time periods, the in-
clusion of the lagged dependent variable would introduce a bias since the dependent
variable, and thus the lagged dependent variable (a right hand regressor), are func-
tions of the individual speciﬁc component of the error term. Nickell (1981) shows
that in the AR(1) case the bias in estimating a dynamic ﬁxed eﬀects model becomes
less important as T grows. Judson and Owen (1999) test the performance of the least
squares ﬁxed eﬀects estimator by means of Monte Carlo simulations, concentrating on
panels with typical macroeconomic dimensions (like ours), i.e. small N and T.T h e i r
analysis suggest that the ﬁxed eﬀects estimator performs fairly well when T>20, i.e.
with a T dimension similar to ours.
The ﬁxed eﬀects assumes homoskedasticity and if the assumption is not met then
the estimates will be ineﬃcient. A groupwise likelihood ratio heteroskedasticity test
was performed on the residuals of the baseline model estimated by OLS. The test is
chi-squared distributed with N − 1 degrees of freedom, where N is the number of
groups in the sample. The result of the test led to a rejection of the null hypothesis
of homoskedasticity across groups for both net loans and grants regressions.
Baltagi and Li (1995) suggest an LM test for serial correlation in ﬁxed eﬀects
models where the asymptotic distributions of the test statistics is calculated for large
T. Under the alternative assumption for the error autocorrelation structure, i.e. an
AR(1), the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in the disturbance is not rejected
at conventional levels. Thus, we did not correct for the autocorrorrelations in the
residuals and to adopt a feasible ﬁxed eﬀect GLS estimator, incorporating only het-
eroskedasticity across countries.
34We thank a referee for suggesting to control for policy reform eﬀort.
217 Estimation results
We estimate our panel of 53 countries for the period 1982-2001 by GLS, including
both country-speciﬁca n dt i m ee ﬀects. The hypotheses of not signiﬁcance of country
dummies and time dummies were indeed rejected at any reasonable signiﬁcance level,
as Table 4 shows. The results of the estimation of equation (1) are also presented in
Table 4.
As expected, IMF loans are rather persistent. The estimated regression shows
that IMF disbursements are not signiﬁcantly related to previous-year disbursements
from any other group of creditors: only the lagged dependent variable is strongly
signiﬁcant (at the 1% level).
Interestingly, and consistently with other results in this literature, economic per-
formance does appear to inﬂuence IMF lending. Column 1 shows that a lower GDP
growth, lower international reserves, higher current account deﬁcits and smaller in-
vestments all have a positive eﬀect on IMF lending (i.e., a worse economic performance
increase the demand of IMF loans) and these eﬀects are signiﬁcant at the 5% level
(with the only exception of the coeﬃcient of the current account which is signiﬁcant
only at the 10%). The coeﬃcient of population is also signiﬁcant at the 10% level,
suggesting that bigger countries do receive greater disbursements. By contrast, per
capita GDP and the rate of inﬂation do not signiﬁcantly aﬀect IMF loans, and the
growth rate of government consumption negatively aﬀects the probability of an agree-
ment with the IMF (though not at conventional levels of signiﬁcance). A heavy debt
service burden (relative to exports) increases countries’ need for external ﬁnance and
thus their demand for IMF loans, where this eﬀect is highly signiﬁcant (at the 1%).35
The coeﬃcient of the CPIA index does not signiﬁcantly explain the allocation
of new IMF loans. This result is, in principle, quite surprising as it implies that a
country’s reform eﬀort does not inﬂuence disbursements which are supposed to be
granted precisely according to such eﬀort. However, this result is indeed consistent
with our theory which suggests the existence of distortions in the IMF lending policy.
Only the coeﬃcient of the share of debt held by commercial banks is highly sig-
niﬁcant (at the 1% level). Indeed, IMF disbursements signiﬁcantly increase with the
lagged value of the share of debt held by commercial banks, while the impact of bi-
lateral and multilateral debt and of the debt share held by private bondholders is not
signiﬁcant. This suggests that IMF lending decisions are responsive to the interests
of large industrial countries.
Finally, while the coeﬃcient of the countries’ shares in the IMF loan portfolio
does not signiﬁcantly explain the allocation of new IMF loans, the coeﬃcient of the
variable representing the cumulative number of years spent by a country under a
Fund programme is positive and highly signiﬁcant (at 1%). This relation between
IMF new loans and the number of years cumulatively spent under each programme
suggests that the length of the relationship with the Fund appears to be an important
determinant of new disbursements, while the hypothesis of ”defensive lending”, as it
is commonly interpreted, is not supported by the data.
35If interpreted as a supply side type of variable, it could also imply that the IMF is more willing
to give new loans if a country is used to service its debt.
22Our results then show that, after controlling for many plausible motivations for
the persistence of Fund lending, duration ”per se” signiﬁcantly explains new loans.
Therefore, persistence in the Fund lending policy needs to be explained considering
additional motivations. We believe that the link between concern for reputation and
the length of the relationship between the Fund and the country, demonstrated in
our theoretical model, provides a credible explanation for persistence.
8C o n c l u s i o n s
IMF conditionality speciﬁes policies and structural reforms which borrowing countries
must meet in order to obtain an IMF loan. In principle, the Fund can enable govern-
ments to implement economic reforms as a result of the leverage it exerts as a creditor.
In practice, the eﬀectiveness of the conditional lending approach has been limited and
numerous empirical studies have shown that long-term ﬁnancial assistance has often
come with an increasing debt burden but only with modest reforms.
This unsatisfactory record of conditional lending has been explained referring to
both demand side and supply side factors. Among the latter (i.e., sources of ineﬃ-
ciency within the IMF), the literature has pointed out how the existence of bureau-
cratic and political biases and “defensive lending” practices might be responsible for
the lack of credibility characterising the IMF threat of interrupting ﬁnancial assistance
when a country is not complying with conditionality.
In this paper we also argue that the lack of credibility of the termination threat
may be one possible explanation of conditional lending failure. However, we suggest
that such lack of credibility might be attributed to a concern for reputation of the
F u n d ,w h i c ha c t sa tt h es a m et i m ea sac r e d i t o ra n da sam o n i t o ro fr e f o r m s .
The IMF desire to hide its surveillance failures, in order to preserve its reputation
of being a good monitor, may actually distort its lending decisions towards greater
laxity (relative to social optimum) in punishing non-compliance with economic re-
forms. Moreover, such distortionary incentives (towards excessive lending) may be
exacerbated by the length of its relationship with a borrowing country. In fact, the
longer this relationship, the more informative (for the quality of the IMF monitoring)
the decision to interrupt a programme would be, since this outcome will have been
inﬂuenced by many past Fund monitoring actions
Estimating a dynamic panel of 53 middle-income countries for the period 1982-
2001, we have empirically investigated whether the duration of the relationship be-
tween the country and the Fund (measured by the cumulated number of years spent
by a country under a programme) played an important role in explaining the alloca-
tion of IMF disbursements, while controlling for countries’ characteristics and their
economic performance and for strategic motivations in Fund lending. Our empiri-
cal results show that a longer relationship signiﬁcantly increases IMF disbursements
which is consistent with the main prediction of the theory.
In order to eliminate distortions in the Fund lending policy, an immediate policy
implication of our analysis would be that of separating its responsibility as a lender
from that as a monitor. For example, the IMF could be responsible for designing
appropriate policy conditions, monitoring and reporting, while, based on such reports,
23ﬁnancial support could be decided by a separated intergovernmental body. However,
f o rt h i ss o l u t i o nt ob ee ﬀective, it is crucial that these two bodies share the same set
of information.
An alternative proposal would envisage giving back to governments the respon-
sibility for designing and implementing economic reforms. The surveillance function
should be limited to the periodical evaluation of the attainment of objectives, rather
than to the implementation of particular policy measures (on this see Collier et al.,
1997). In other words, substituting “procedures conditionality” with “target condi-
tionality”, the IMF would be less involved in managing reforms at a micro level and,
in turn, it would be less responsible for observed disappointing results in the recipient
countries.
24Appendix
Proof. of Proposition 7
Let’s start from the second stage. Let’s suppose that −I1 ≤ e k ≤
← −
k and that, at
t=1, lending (L) has been observed. Applying Bayes’ rule, we obtain:




γρg +( 1− γ)ρb
.
Then, the IMF private gain from reputation would be equal to: γ1(L)+δγ2(L,−I1 ≤
e k ≤
← −
k ),w h e r e :
γ1(L)=prob(g | L)=
γprob(L | g)
γprob(L | g)+( 1− γ)prob(L | b)
,
and:












θ(e k)h(e k | R1 = b R
R
1 )de k.
Alternatively, if −I1 ≤ e k ≤
← −
k and at t=1 not lending (NL) has been observed,
the IMF private gain from reputation would be equal to: γ1(NL)+δγ1(NL),w h e r e :
γ1(NL)=prob(g | NL)=
γ(1 − ρg)
γ(1 − ρg)+( 1− γ)(1 − ρb)
.
Therefore, if the IMF chooses to continue lending, irrespective of e k being too small,
its private gain in reputation with respect to the alternative strategy would be:
Gmax = γ1(L)+δγ2(L,−I1 ≤ e k ≤
← −
k ) − (γ1(NL)+δγ1(NL)), (A-1)
which can be easily shown to be positive.
Now let:
WL(e k)=I2 − p2(R1, b R2(e k))X2
be the welfare loss of the second period project. Notice that WL is continuously
decreasing with e k (see Proposition 1) and that WL(.)=0 when e k = k. We also assume
that the maximum value of λ2WL(e k) (λ2WL(e k = −I1) is greater than λ1Gmax.
In order to have equilibrium strategies consistent with the equilibrium beliefs, the
following inequality must hold:









Therefore, when −I1 ≤ e k ≤
← −
k,the IMF has no incentive to deviate from the equi-
librium strategy NL.
25Let’s now suppose that
← −
k< e k ≤ k a n dt h a ta tt = 1l e n d i n g( L) has been observed.
Noting that, when e k<k, the ﬁrst period project has surely failed (e k = e kf), applying
Bayes’ rule, we obtain:
γ2(L,
← −
k< e k ≤ k)= (A-2)
γ(ρg(1 − p1(R∗)) + (1 − ρg)θ(e k)(1 − p1(b RR
1 ))
γ(ρg(1 − p1(R∗)) + (1 − ρg)θ(e k)(1 − p1(b RR
1 )) + (1 − γ)(ρb(1 − p1(R∗)) + (1 − ρb)θ(e k)(1 − p1(b RR
1 ))
,
from which it is easy to show that (A-2) reaches its maximum value when θ(
← −
k )=0
and its minimum value when θ(
− →
k )=1 , and that:
∂γ2(L,
← −















k< e k ≤ k)= (A-3)
γ(ρg(1 − p1(R∗)) + (1 − ρg)(1 − p1(b RR
1 ))
γ(ρg(1 − p1(R∗)) + (1 − ρg)(1 − p1(b RR
1 )) + (1 − γ)(ρb(1 − p1(R∗)) + (1 − ρb)(1 − p1(b RR
1 ))
.
Therefore, if the IMF chooses to continue lending, when
← −
k< e k ≤ k, its private gain
in reputation with respect to the alternative strategy would be:
G(θ(e k)) = γ1(L)+δγ2(L,
← −








G(θ(e k)) = Gmax and G(θ(e k)) |− →
k ≤h k≤k= Gmin,
Since the probability to continue lending is increasing with e k, the signal becomes less
informative as capital grows. Notice that Gmin is found substituting (A-3) into (A-4)
and Gmax was deﬁned in A-1.
For the equilibrium strategies to be consistent with the equilibrium beliefs, the
probability to continue lending is found implicitly, solving for θ(e k):
λ1G(θ(e k)) = λ2WL(e k), (A-5)
so that, when
← −
k ≤ e k ≤
− →
k,the payoﬀ associated to the strategy NL is the same as
the payoﬀ associated to the strategy L. Notice that
− →
k is found by solving (A-5) for e k,
when the probability of continuing lending is 1. Since WL(e k = k)=0and Gmin> 0,
it is immediate to verify that
− →
k< k.
Finally, as G(e k)=Gmin > 0, when
− →
k ≤ e k ≤ k, it follows that λ1Gmin ≥
λ2WL(e k). Thus, in this interval, the IMF will lend with probability one even if the
social surplus is negative.
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29Table 1: List of middle income countries in the sample 
1) Algeria  28) Malaysia 
2) Argentina  29) Mauritius 
3) Belize  30) Mexico 
4) Bolivia  31) Morocco 
5) Botswana  32) Oman 
6) Brazil  33) Panama 
7) Cape Verde  34) Paraguay 
8) Chile  35) Peru 
9) China  36) Philippines 
10) Colombia  37) Poland 
11) Costa Rica  38) Romania 
12) Dominica  39) Seychelles 
13) Dominican Republic  40) Sri Lanka 
14) Ecuador  41) St. Kitts and Nevis 
15) Egypt, Arab Rep.  42) St. Lucia 
16) El Salvador  43) St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
17) Fiji  44) Swaziland 
18) Gabon  45) Syrian Arab Republic 
19) Grenada  46) Thailand 
20) Guatemala  47) Tonga 
21) Guyana  48) Trinidad and Tobago 
22) Honduras  49) Tunisia 
23) Hungary  50) Turkey 
24) Indonesia  51) Uruguay 
25) Iran, Islamic Rep.  52) Vanuatu 
26) Jamaica  53) Venezuela, RB 
27) Jordan   
Source: World Bank Table 2: Variables definition 
Variable Definition  Units 
Population Population  Billions 
Pc-GDP   Gross Domestic Product  Ratio to Population (thousands) 
Inflation  Consumer Price Index  Annual Rate of change 
Gr-GDP  Real GDP growth  Annual Rate of change 
Reserves  International reserves  Ratio to Imports 
Current Account  Current Account  Ratio to GDP 
Investments  Goss fixed domestic investments  Ratio to GDP 
Gr-Government Consumption  Gov Consumption growth  Annual Rate of change 
CPIA  Index of policy and institutional 
assessment  
Index variable, rating scale 1 (low) 
through 6 (high) 
Total debt service  Total debt service  Ratio to Exports 
IMF Disbursments  IMF Disbursments  Ratio to GDP 
Multilateral Disbursments  Bilateral Grants  Ratio to GDP 
Bilateral Disbursment  Multilateral Disbursments  Ratio to GDP 
Bank Disbursments  Bank Disbursments  Ratio to GDP 
Bonds Disbursments  Bonds Disbursments  Ratio to GDP 
IMF loan share  IMF credit outstanding  Ratio  to  total  IMF  credit 
outstanding in each year 
Multilateral Debt  Long term Mul Debt  Ratio to GDP 
Bilateral Debt  Long term Bilateral Debt  Ratio to GDP 
Bank Debt  Long term Bank Debt  Ratio to GDP 
Bonds Debt  Long term Bonds Debt  Ratio to GDP 
Cumulative  Years    Cumulative years spent under 
each programme 
Sequence of years Table 3: Data source 
Variable Source 
Population International  Financial Statistics (IFS) 
Pc-GDP   World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
Inflation  World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
Gr-GDP  World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
International reserves  Global Development Finance (GDF) 
Current Account  Global Development Finance (GDF) 
Investments  World Development Indicators (WDI) 
Gr-Government Consumption  World Development Indicators (WDI) 
CPIA World  Bank 
Total debt service  Global Development Finance (GDF) 
IMF Disbursments  Global Development Finance (GDF) 
Multilateral Disbursments  Global Development Finance (GDF) 
Bilateral Disbursment  Global Development Finance (GDF) 
Bank Disbursments  Global Development Finance (GDF) 
Bonds Disbursments  Global Development Finance (GDF) 
IMF loan share  IMF Financial Data (IMF) 
Multilateral Debt  Global Development Finance (GDF) 
Bilateral Debt  Global Development Finance (GDF) 
Bank Debt  Global Development Finance (GDF) 
Bonds Debt  Global Development Finance (GDF) 
Cumulative years  International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
 Table 4 IMF Debt Disbursments 
  IMF Dis 
Population 0.0156* 
 (1.654) 
Pc-GDP (-1)  0.0002 
 (1.031) 
Inflation (-1)  0.0001 
 (1.331) 
Gr-GDP (-1)  -0.0092** 
 (2.308) 
Reserves (-1)  -0.0021** 
 (2.453) 
Current Account (-1)  -0.0051* 
 (1.807) 
Investment (-1)  -0.0085** 
 (2.467) 
Gr-Gov Consumption (-1)  -0.0010 
 (1.160) 
CPIA (-1)  0.0001 
 (0.473) 
Total Debt Service (-1)  0.0033*** 
 (2.583) 
Debt Share M (-1)  -0.0024 
 (0.621) 
IMF loan share (-1)  -0.0056 
 (0.484) 
Debt Share B (-1)  0.0025 
 (0.883) 
Debt Share Banks (-1)  0.0079*** 
 (2.708) 
Debt Share Bonds (-1)  0.0013 
 (0.244) 
Disbursments M (-1)  0.0038 
 (0.244) 
Disbursments IMF (-1)  0.0831*** 
 (2.868) 
Disbursments B (-1)  0.0131 
 (1.017) 
Disbursments Banks (-1)  -0.0056 
 (0.555) 
Disbursments Bonds (-1)  -0.0237 
 (1.142) 





Number of panelid  53 
Number of years  20 
SE of regression  0.0117 
SE of dependent variable  0.0131 
CD joint significance test  Prob>chi2=0.0045 
TD joint significance test  Prob>chi2=0.0030 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Figure 1